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Freed and Polsby's basic insight is that comparable-worth is-
sues arise under the Equal Pay Act.1 They consider the acceptance
of the Act to be anomalous, given the controversy over the merits
of a comparable-worth rule.2 Whether they mean to say more than
this is not clear, but they seem at least to suggest that the Equal
Pay Act's interference with market values should be more contro-
versial.3 Further, they seem to be making an indirect argument
about the merits of a comparable-worth rule: given the existing
case law, there is reason to doubt the competency of courts to de-
cide comparable-worth claims.4
I think that Freed and Polsby's basic insight is quite right:
there are comparable-worth issues in current Equal Pay Act cases.
I also agree that courts should be reluctant to decide cases solely
on the basis of comparable-worth arguments. Congress considered
and rejected a comparable-worth standard when it enacted the
Equal Pay Act,5 and courts should apply the antidiscrimination
legislation Congress did enact in a manner consistent with congres-
sional intent.
Nevertheless, I have three major problems with Freed and
Polsby's analysis. First, Freed and Polsby purport to be criticizing
Equal Pay Act case law only because of courts' willingness to de-
cide cases on the basis of comparable-worth arguments.6 But their
real objection may be to antidiscrimination legislation as such.
Comparable-worth problems are not unique to Equal Pay Act
cases; they are innate in the implementation of any antidiscrimina-
tion legislation. If Freed and Polsby disagree, on the merits, with
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I thank Frank H. Easterbrook and
Cass R. Sunstein for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
2 Freed & Polsby, Comparable Worth in the Equal Pay Act, 51 U. CHL L. Rav. 1078,
1079 (1984).
3 See, e.g., id. at 1079, 1085, 1104-05.
" See, e.g., id. at 1090, 1102.
5 See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
1 See, e.g., Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1079, 1087, 1090, 1110.
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the Equal Pay Act because comparable-worth issues tend to affect
the outcome of cases under it, they should also disagree, on the
merits, with Title VII, which mandates that employers treat em-
ployees equally regardless of race, sex, religion, color, or national
origin.
Second, the fact that there is widespread controversy over
comparable worth and widespread acceptance of the principle of
equal pay for equal work is no anomaly. The comparisons required
under the Equal Pay Act are fairly limited in scope: for example,
do hospital aides and orderlies perform substantially similar tasks
under substantially similar conditions, even though the orderlies'
patients are men and the aides' patients are women? True, differ-
ent jobs are being compared, but the question the courts must ad-
dress is whether the differences between the jobs are minor. Under
a comparable-worth standard, the inquiry would be whether quite
different jobs were valued properly relative to each other: for ex-
ample, do secretaries and janitors-or receptionists and truck driv-
ers-receive comparable pay in light of the relative worth of their
jobs to their employers or to society as a whole? The difference
between Equal Pay Act claims and comparable-worth claims seems
to be more than a difference of degree and is certainly sufficient to
explain the general acceptance of the one and the rejection of the
other.
Third, courts have not been as incompetent at handling com-
parable-worth issues as Freed and Polsby maintain. If they are ar-
guing indirectly against the merits of a comparable-worth standard
on the basis of "bad" Equal Pay Act case law, the argument is
undermined by their inaccurate presentation of that case law.
Freed and Polsby organize their discussion into four topics:
the methods available to courts for comparing nonidentical jobs in
Equal Pay Act cases; the relevance of job segregation to such
claims; defenses to Equal Pay Act claims; and a detailed discussion
of three cases raising comparable-worth issues. Like Freed and
Polsby, I will leave aside questions about the merits of existing an-
tidiscrimination legislation and of comparable worth. I limit my
discussion to the issue they directly address: comparable-worth is-
sues in current case law.
I. COMPARING NONIDENrICAL JoBs
Since it is rare that any two jobs are exactly identical, Freed
Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
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and Polsby are correct in pointing out that Equal Pay Act cases
often require courts to determine whether nonidentical jobs are so
similar as to offer a proper foundation for Equal Pay Act claims."
Further, few plaintiffs present "smoking gun" evidence of discrimi-
natory intent.9 Only by reference to subjective notions of compara-
ble worth will most courts be able to determine whether an as-
serted difference between two jobs is merely a pretext for
discrimination.'
Two points are worth noting. First, the statutory requirement
of equal pay for equal work would have little force if employers
could circumvent it by creating trivial variations in job conditions,
responsibilities, and the like. Few jobs are identical in all respects;
a requirement of absolute identity could result in an Equal Pay
Act with no bite. For these reasons, courts have reasonably refused
to limit Equal Pay Act claims to cases involving identical jobs.'
With a standard short of absolute identity, courts are able to con-
sider whether the purported justification is a pretext, an inquiry
that should consider whether there is evidence of discriminatory
intent apart from the pay differential.
Second, courts do not in fact rely exclusively on comparable-
worth arguments in deciding Equal Pay Act cases. Freed and
Polsby cite decided cases'5 in a way that suggests that the courts
were persuaded by the comparable-worth arguments alone. In each
case, however, other facts were also considered relevant by the
courts; there was, in each case, if not a smoking gun, at least a
smoldering background.
' Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1085-92.
' Id. at 1079-80.
'0 Id. at 1085.
11 See, e.g., Brennan v. Prince William Hasp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 285 (4th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975); Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prods., 424 F.2d 356,
360 (8th Cir. 1970); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 905 (1970).
Not all courts have adopted the "substantial equality" test cited by Freed and Polsby,
but most courts have adopted standards more or less comparable to it. See, e.g., B. SCHLEI &
P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DiscubuNATioN LAw 447 n.49 (1983) (comparing Hodgson v.
Golden Isles Convalescent Homes, Inc., 468 F.2d 1256, 1258 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
(rejecting "comparable work" standard), with Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238
(5th Cir. 1973) (standard must be higher than mere comparability yet lower than absolute
identity)).
12 See Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1088-89 & nn.16 & 18 (citing Brennan v. Prince
William Hasp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975); Shultz
v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prods., 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1970); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass
Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970)).
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In Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.,13 for example, the employer
had employed only men until a labor shortage forced it to hire
women. The women were assigned to a new job category called "fe-
male selector-packers" and were paid $2.14 per hour. Only men
filled the old job, now called "male selector-packers"; they were
paid $2.35 per hour. These two jobs, the court found, were identi-
cal. 1 4 Occasionally, however, at least some male packers were re-
quired to perform the job of "snap-up boys," which paid $2.16 per
hour. The court saw "no rational explanation" that could justify
paying all male packers, some of whom occasionally performed
work paying two cents per hour more than female packers, twenty-
one cents more per hour than the women. 15 Against this factual
background, the court saw not merely a discriminatory effect but
also a discriminatory motive."6
Whether a purported justification for a pay differential is a
pretext for intentional discrimination on the basis of sex is ulti-
mately a question of fact about motivation. The credibility of an
employer's purported justification, however valid in one case, may
be undermined in another by facts, like those in Wheaton Glass,
that suggest intentional discrimination.1 7
Is 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
14 Id. at 263.
15 Id. The court found the company's asserted justification for the $.21 pay differen-
tial-that the male packer job required the additional "flexibility" of occasionally assuming
the job of snap-up boy-to be wholly unconvincing, partly because it was never proven that
all male packers did in fact perform as snap-up boys. Id. at 263-64.
11 Id. at 264. The other two cases cited by Freed and Polsby for reliance on a compara-
ble-worth analysis are Shultz v. American Can Co.-Dixie Prods., 424 F.2d 356 (8th Cir.
1970), and Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975). American Can is factually quite similar to Wheaton Glass. There
too, male and female employees performed virtually identical basic jobs, but the men also
occasionally performed another task, not in addition to their work load but as a substitute
for their basic work. Although the combination job had been opened to women in 1965, and
although some women had requested assignment to it, the court found that, as of 1970, only
men held the combination job, and they were paid $.20 per hour more than the women. 420
F.2d at 358-59. In the third case, Prince William Hospital, male orderlies' wages were raised
above those of female aides only when the hospital had difficulty attracting men to the job.
And the only different task, routine catheterizations, was performed only once or twice
weekly-not per orderly but in toto. 503 F.2d at 290.
17 It is not generally accepted law that the mere fact that job B pays less than job A
precludes an employer from paying more for combined job A-B than for job A alone. See 1
A. LARsON & L. LARsoN, EMPLOYMxNT DISCBINMATION § 29.40, at 7-25 (1983) (discussing
cases that suggest a "caveat against applying too mechanically" the rule in American Can).
Freed and Polsby attempt to strengthen this analysis by reporting that an employer's justi-
fications for paying a premium for a combination job may be regarded as unconvincing un-
less each holder of the A-B job spends time on tasks A and B in the same ratio. Thus,
according to Freed and Polsby, the law regards straight salaries as unreasonable, and em-
ployers must, in effect, pay on a piecework basis. Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1089. The
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Freed and Polsby are on firmer ground in arguing that, when
evaluating the reasonableness of the employer's decision to com-
pensate differently two jobs that an Equal Pay Act plaintiff claims
are substantially similar, it will not be possible for a court to avoid
evaluating the justification for the magnitude of the pay differen-
tial. Here they cite language from Hodgson v. Brookhaven General
Hospital,18 in which the Fifth Circuit appears to have adopted a
standard requiring that the additional tasks of the more highly
compensated position be "of an economic value commensurate
with the pay differential."1 9 Even without any accepted standard
of relative job valuation, however, some jobs may be so similar, but
carry wages so disparate, that the difference in pay cannot credibly
be justified by the minor differences between the jobs. At least in
the extreme case, common sense provides an adequate standard for
a conclusion that the purported reason is a pretext. Further, it is
by no means clear that the Fifth Circuit would be willing to adopt
a more intrusive standard.20
I am not arguing that, in evaluating Equal Pay Act claims,
courts are never affected by comparable-worth arguments. In
Wheaton Glass, for example, the persuasive force of the smolder-
ing background was strengthened by the fact that the employer's
purported justification for paying the male holders of combination
job A-B twenty-one cents more than the female holders of job A
seemed rather weak, since holders of job B were paid only two
cents more than the women. My quarrel is with Freed and Polsby's
implication that comparable-worth arguments, standing alone, rou-
two cases Freed and Polsby cite for this point, Wheaton Glass and American Can, are
"smoldering background" cases. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. Their lan-
guage, cited out of context, is not a statement of any accepted Equal Pay Act rule. Further,
in Wheaton Glass, the court stated that there was no finding that all the male holders of the
A-B combination job did any job B tasks, though they all received 10% more in pay than
the female holders of job A. 421 F.2d at 263.
is 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970). See Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1089-90.
19 436 F.2d at 725.
20 In Brookhaven, the court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and remanded for
more evidence on whether the jobs at issue required "equal effort." 436 F.2d at 727. The
language quoted by Freed and Polsby was not relevant to anything at issue in the case;
indeed, the Fifth Circuit did not even mention the amount of the wage disparity found by
the district court. The quotation is part of a rather glib statement of applicable law, made in
the course of reversing a judgment for the plaintiff and supported by the Fifth Circuit's
citations to American Can and Wheaton Glass, the two smoldering-background cases dis-
cussed supra note 16.
In addition, the specific examples given by the Fifth Circuit (appearing in the opinion
after the language quoted by Freed and Polsby) may be "restrictive of that language." C.
SuLvAN, M. ZuamR & R. RicHARs, FEnmuL STATUTORY LAw OF EMPLOYMENT DIscRBENA-
TION § 10.7, at 619 (1980).
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tinely dispose of Equal Pay Act cases. Courts have not widely re-
jected employers' justifications solely on the basis of comparable-
worth notions. In the three cases cited by Freed and Polsby, the
courts certainly did not do so; in each case there was evidence of
discrimination apart from the pay disparity.
H. THE RELEVANCE OF JOB SEGREGATION
Freed and Polsby make a second major point: courts may too
readily tend to find jobs "equal" for Equal Pay Act purposes where
jobs that are only "similar" are segregated according to sex.21 Ac-
cording to Freed and Polsby, courts deciding Equal Pay Act cases
should ignore such segregation because Title VII is available to
handle it.22 I agree that courts seem more likely to find jobs equal
when some element of job segregation is present. But it is not true
that Title VII provides an adequate remedy for all cases of job
segregation.
Job segregation is often legal under Title VII because sex may
be a "bona fide occupational qualification. '23 In such cases, the
only possible remedy for sex discrimination is under the Equal Pay
Act.24 Even where job segregation is illegal under Title VII, how-
ever, there may be no effective relief under that statute. For exam-
ple, it might be difficult for a woman to show that, absent discrimi-
nation, she would have been given a job when, because the
employer advertised only for men, she did not in fact apply for it. 25
31 Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1091-92.
22 See Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1092.
23 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982). For a
discussion of the scope of the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception, see C. SuLmi-
vAN, M. ZimUaR & R. RICHARDS, supra note 20, § 2.4.
24 Freed and Posby concede that in a world without Title VII, judges would be reluc-
tant to characterize work as unequal when jobs are quite similar and women are confined to
the lower-paying job. Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1091-92. Since there is a Title VII,
however, judges who are reluctant to find jobs unequal when women are segregated into a
lower-paying but substantially equivalent job are "quarreling with the legislative decision to
prohibit employers only from paying unequal wages for equal work and, in effect, to permit
broader classes of sex-discriminatory employment practices." Id. But in enacting the "bona
fide occupational qualification" defense, Congress chose not to prohibit certain forms of sex
discrimination in job placement only because other interests, such as nursing home patients'
privacy concerns, outweighed the interest in banning all discrimination. See 110 CoNG. Rac.
2718 (1964) (statement of Rep. Goodell). It does not follow that Congress also meant to
allow a nursing home to use gender as the ground for paying aides less than orderlies. The
problems in remedying the job segregation Congress did prohibit, discussed infra text ac-
companying note 25, are additional reasons why courts should not ignore job segregation in
considering Equal Pay Act claims.
35 For example, in Peltier v. City of Fargo, 533 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1976), one of the cases
cited by Freed and Polsby, the police department advertised for men only. Id. at 376.
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Finally, the Title VII remedy for past job segregation is slow. A
woman awarded relief will be entitled to the higher-paying job only
when there is an opening.2
Given the problems with remedying job segregation under Ti-
tle VII, one must decide whether a trier of fact should ignore job
segregation when considering allegations that an employer's pur-
ported explanation for a pay differential is a pretext for discrimi-
nation. I see no reason why a trier of fact should always consider
segregation irrelevant. Job segregation, with women limited to the
lower-paying job, as in Wheaton Glass, may bolster other evidence
suggesting that the real cause of the pay disparity is not the pur-
ported difference between the jobs but rather the sex of the incum-
bents.2 7 This point is made in many of the cases. In Wheaton
Glass, for example, the court stressed that the classification of se-
lector-packers into two job categories originated when women were
first hired by the employer.28
III. DEFENSES
Freed and Polsby maintain that any reason offered by an em-
ployer in defense of pay differentials may be seen either as further
evidence of discrimination or as irrelevant when males and females
hold equivalent positions and receive unequal pay. Thus, an expla-
nation based on subjective measures of productivity may be per-
ceived as evidence of discrimination, and an explanation based on
prior education and experience may be seen as irrelevant if the
man and woman hold substantially equal jobs. Freed and Polsby
do note that not every court would react in the way that they have
described.29 I submit that few courts would react this way and that
many of the cases cited by Freed and Polsby support the proposi-
tions for which they are cited but little"0 or not at all.M1 Further, I
Women may not have applied in response to such advertisements.
26 Some courts do award "front pay" in this kind of situation, but "front pay" is not
routinely awarded. See B. ScFmm & P. GROSSmA, supra note 11, at 434-36.
1T The relevance of job segregation has been explained by other commentators:
The basic notion . . . is . . . that, given two sex-segregated jobs which are roughly
comparable, one might doubt that the purported job differences are the real motive for
differences in pay if members of the disfavored sex could do the different work but are
denied the opportunity. The more likely inference is that it is not jobs but gender
which explains the wage difference.
C. SuLLivAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RIcHARDs, supra note 20, § 10.7, at 621.
28 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 264 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970); see supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
:' Freed & Posby, supra note 2, at 1094.
0 For example, Freed and Polsby cite four cases for the proposition that "[n]umerous
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suggest that those decisions that are accurately cited"2 are simply
wrong and unusual,3 3 unless the judgment for the plaintiff could be
said to have rested on other evidence of discrimination. 4
courts appear to take the position that differences in education, experience, and other
'human capital' qualifications of particular employees are immaterial if the employer is hir-
ing for jobs that are 'substantially equal."' Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1095 & n.35.
None of the four cited cases indicates, however, even in dicta, that human-capital quali-
fications are immaterial. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Basic Inc., 256 F. Supp. 786, 790 n.4 (D. Nev.
1966) (human-capital differences must be pleaded by employer as a merit-system defense).
In the other three cases, the courts merely held that experience and training are immaterial
if they are irrelevant to the job actually performed and are not needed to afford flexibility.
See United States v. City of Milwaukee, 441 F. Supp. 1371, 1375 (E.D. Wis. 1977) ("The
training which jailers receive as patrol officers is not utilized ...at the jail, nor are they
assigned with any frequency to duties outside the jail. In effect, the assignment to the jail is
a permanent assignment."); Peltier v. City of Fargo, 533 F.2d 374, 377-79 (8th Cir. 1976)
(similar); Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 416 F. Supp. 844, 853 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (simi-
lar), afl'd in part, modified in part on other grounds, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978).
81 See, e.g., Grove v. Frostburg Nat'l Bank, 549 F. Supp. 922 (D. Md. 1982); Freed &
Polsby, supra note 2, at 1096 & nn.40, 41. Grove was a disparate-treatment case under Title
VII as well as an Equal Pay Act case. The plaintiffs won on the Title VII disparate-treat-
ment claim involving intentional discrimination in job placement. Freed and Polsby cite
Grove for the proposition that employers might not be permitted to show, in defending
Equal Pay Act suits, that differences in pay were due to differences in productivity. Freed &
Polsby, supra note 2, at 1096. But not all positions have equal potential for productivity. In
Grove, the court found intentional discrimination, not happenstance, to be the cause of the
differences in job placement.
32 It is difficult to find an important case that Freed and Polsby report with complete
accuracy. Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974), may be as
close as any. It is cited in support of the proposition that an employer's subjective evalua-
tion of job performance may be rejected by the courts because it reflects "the sort of invidi-
ous discrimination that the Act is intended to eradicate." Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at
1096 & n.39. In Victoria Bank, the court's own comparison of the education and experience
of male and female employees, however, indicated that the employer's asserted subjective
impressions were contrary to fact. 493 F.2d at 902. The Victoria Bank court did accept a
defense based on a merit system, even though its application required subjective judgments.
See infra note 54.
88 See, e.g., United States v. City of Milwaukee, 441 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Wis. 1977)
(discussed infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text).
See Peltier v. City of Fargo, 533 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1976) (only men allowed on police
force; when women took over ticketing cars as "car markers," salary reduced by 50%); Di
Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 416 F. Supp. 844, 848-49 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (after plaintiff
quit, defendant increased salary when male applicant turned down job because of salary,
three women applicants had previously done so without same effect), aff'd in part, modified
in part on other grounds, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978); Wirtz v. Basic Inc., 256 F. Supp. 786,
787 (D. Nev. 1966) (several indications of intentional discrimination-e.g., statement made
by defendant's manager when Congress was about to pass the Equal Pay Act that "Congress
would never pass such a foolish law as that").
Even when there is no evidence of discrimination apart from salary differentials, some
defenses, though relevant as a matter of law, may fail credibly to explain the differentials.
See, e.g., EEOC v. First Citizens Bank, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,508, at 29,347 (D.
Mont. 1983) (cited by Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1096 & n.39) (rejecting as illusory
employer's creation of an "executive trainee" category for male employee when there was no
real training program, formal or informal).
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The Equal Pay Act is hardly unique in inspiring some dead-
wrong decisions. But the fact that there are some wrongly decided
Equal Pay Act cases does not support Freed and Polsby's implica-
tion that comparable worth would therefore be a bad idea or that
the Equal Pay Act should be more controversial. Indeed, factors
such as training and experience are generally considered relevant
to comparable-worth evaluations. If ever there were a significant
number of Equal Pay Act cases holding otherwise, it might be a
good thing to amend the statute to clarify the original congres-
sional intent. 5
IV. THREE REAL-LIFE PROBLEMS
Freed and Polsby's next criticism of current antidiscrimina-
tion law, which again by implication is a criticism of comparable
worth, consists of a discussion of three cases. The authors spend
three pages on United States v. City of Milwaukee,"6 a decision
from the Eastern District of Wisconsin with, I hope, little prece-
dential weight. I am somewhat puzzled by their eitended presenta-
tion of one outrageous district court opinion, with which they obvi-
ously disagree, as if it were generally accepted and typical. 7 I fail
35 For examples of cases recognizing the validity of wage differentials based on relevant
training and experience, see Knight v. City of Bogalusa, 717 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1983) (meter
maids replaced by higher-paid police officers with more training and experience; held: no
discrimination); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982) (Congress intended
that employers continue to be able to vary pay with training and experience even though
such factors may reflect opportunities denied to women in the past); Craft v. Metromedia,
Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (evidence demonstrated that the difference in pay
between female plaintiff and male employee was attributable to several factors other than
sex, particularly education and experience).
36 441 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Wis. 1977); see Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1100-02.
37 For examples of the many cases that, contrary to City of Milwaukee, recognize the
validity of differentials based on training and experience, see cases cited supra note 35.
Freed and Polsby agree that City of Milwaukee is "silly" but claim that "it is perfectly
consistent with the approach of the numerous leading Equal Pay Act cases upon which the
... court relied." Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1102. Actually, the court cited only two
cases in its substantive analysis. In considering whether the jailers' and matrons' jobs were
equivalent in terms of responsibility and effort-the aspect of the case most troubling to
Freed and Polsby-the court did not cite a single case. 441 F. Supp. at 1375-76. In holding
that the jobs were equivalent because real and substantial differences in responsibility were
irrelevant, City of Milwaukee is quite unusual. Compare City of Milwaukee with EEOC v.
First Citizens Bank, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,508 (D. Mont. 1983) (although assis-
tant vice-presidents had the same title, the male and female vice-presidents had different
responsibilities, and a pay differential was therefore not a violation of the Equal Pay Act).
For a discussion of the rule that human-capital differences can justify pay differentials only
when relevant to job performance, see supra note 30.
Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), is a case directly op-
posed to City of Milwaukee. There, the Ninth Circuit held that because matrons guarded
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to see its relevance to anything other than the fact that inevitably,
under any statute, one will find the odd court doing odd things.
The case fails to support any inference about the dangers of com-
parable worth, since it would have been wrong even under a com-
parable-worth standard."
Freed and Polsby also discuss Winkes v. Brown University9
and Melani v. Board of Higher Education.° In discussing Melani,
they raise important and troubling comparable-worth issues,
though it should be noted that Melani was brought under Title
VII and section 1983, not under the Equal Pay Act. Freed and Pol-
sby's discussion of Winkes suggests that their basic objection may
be to antidiscrimination legislation as such and not to the Equal
Pay Act alone.
A. Winkes
Winkes v. Brown University is a simple, straightforward
Equal Pay Act case. In September 1977, Brown University entered
into a consent decree committing the University to increase the
number of tenured women on its faculty. Zerner, a woman, and
Winkes, a man, were both tenured professors of art history, and
Winkes was paid somewhat more than Zerner. In 1978, Northwest-
ern University offered Zerner a job at a sixty-four percent salary
increase. Brown matched Northwestern's offer, and Zerner stayed
at Brown. The chairman of the art department recommended to
the university's provost that Winkes's salary be increased to match
Zerner's since there were no significant differences in their qualifi-
cations or work. Some adjustments were made over the next few
years in Winkes's salary, but Winkes was paid substantially less
than Zerner throughout this period. Although the art department
often increased salaries in response to outside offers, the district
court found that the response to Zerner's outside offer was unique
fewer prisoners and spent more time doing clerical work than jailers, matrons' and jailers'
jobs were not equal for Equal Pay Act purposes. The plaintiffs successfully sought certiorari
in the Supreme Court on another issue but did not contest further the relevance of the
differences in responsibilities. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 165
(1981) (if the county intentionally paid matrons less because of sex rather than because of
difference in responsibility, Title VII would be violated).
38 The fact that one job is more demanding than another is a relevant factor even under
a comparable-worth theory.
31 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1041 (D.R.I. 1983). As this article went to press,
Winkes was reversed by a divided panel of the First Circuit. Winkes v. Brown Univ., No. 83-
1649 (1st Cir. Oct. 26, 1984). For a discussion of the First Circuit's opinion, see infra note
59.
", 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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in being a dollar-for-dollar match and an "anomalously high" in-
crease compared with similar responses.41
I would agree with the district court's holding that Brown vio-
lated the Equal Pay Act. None of the employer's defenses should
prevail. Brown's "merit system" argument looks like something
pulled out of a hat after getting a lawyer involved. For at least two
reasons, the fact that Brown only offered Zerner what was neces-
sary to retain her services should not be a valid defense. First, the
court found that the same counteroffer would not have been made
to a man. Second, the Equal Pay Act was designed to correct mar-
ket forces perceived as operating to value employees differentially
by sex. It is no secret that there is a shortage of women in some
departments of some universities. It seems likely that Northwest-
ern's generous offer and Brown's counteroffer reflected that
shortage rather than any valuation of art historians independent of
sex.
The Winkes court was also correct in holding that the univer-
sity's affirmative-action plan, as embodied in the consent decree,
did not shield Brown from liability for the sex-based differential in
pay. That plan covered hiring, contract renewal, promotion, and
tenure. The "overall thrust" of the plan was "to ensure that hiring
and promotional decisions at Brown will be based on merit and
achievement, not on gender."'42
Brown's affirmative-action plan does appear to be valid be-
cause it is consistent with the legislative history of the 1972 exten-
sion of Title VII to academic employment.4 3 As the House Com-
mittee Report indicates, Congress was concerned about the
exclusion of women from the status system governing academic ap-
pointments. Appointments are based on prestige, and women are
perceived, according to the authorities cited by the Report, as hav-
ing no prestige, regardless of their merit.44 The Brown affirmative-
41 Winkes, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1044.
42 Id. at 1049.
43 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982)). In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979), the Supreme Court upheld an affirmative-action plan because of its consistency
with congressional intent in enacting Title VII.
" The House Committee on Education and Labor noted the following in its report-
When they have been hired into educational institutions, particularly in institutions of
higher education, women have been relegated to positions of lesser standing than their
male counterparts. In a study conducted by Theodore Kaplow and Reece J. McGee, it
was found that the primary factors determining the hiring of male faculty members
were prestige and compatibility, but that women were generally considered to be
outside of the prestige system altogether.
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action plan, designed to ensure equal treatment of women on the
basis of merit, compensates for this possibly unconscious bias
against women academics. Although the Brown affirmative-action
plan was valid, however, it did not authorize paying women more
than men on the basis of sex. And although the scope of allowable
affirmative-action plans is far from clear,45 it is at least doubtful
that an employer could offer higher salaries to women or minorities
as part of any affirmative-action plan.46
Freed and Polsby raise two objections to Winkes: the court's
"rejecti[on] [of] labor-market explanations for pay disparities" and
the court's rejection of Brown's merit-system arguments, as a mat-
ter of law, on the ground that Brown had no objective or system-
atic method of evaluating merit.47
By criticizing Winkes's rejection of market valuations, Freed
and Polsby imply that the market valuation was based on factors
other than sex. I suspect that the premium was offered because
antidiscrimination regulations have varied market values and have
done so in such a way as to cause differentials based on sex. Of
course, premiums based on sex are inconsistent with the express
mandates of Title VIP and the Equal Pay Act,4' but Brown Uni-
versity may nevertheless have been motivated by Zerner's sex and
by current antidiscrimination legislation in offering her the pre-
mium; without her, they would be more vulnerable to liability
under the consent decree as well as more vulnerable to other law-
suits under Title VII50 and Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972.51 Brown may also have been responding to other pres-
House COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITES ENFORCEMENT
ACT OF 1971, H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1971) (citing T. CAPLOW & R.
McGra, THE ACADEMIC MARKMPLACE 111 (1958)), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AC OF 1972, at 61, 80 (1972).
4"See Meltzer, The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination
Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 459-65 (1980).
45 In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), the Supreme Court upheld an
affirmative-action plan designed as a temporary measure to eliminate a manifest racial im-
balance by giving blacks a preference for admission to a training program. Blacks were not,
however, otherwise treated differently as trainees or employees. Rather, the plan was
designed to eliminate the present effects of past societal discrimination that had tended to
exclude them from skilled jobs. Paying a higher salary to retain a skilled minority member,
whether a black craftsman or a female art historian, is a quite different form of affirmative
action. This would do more than compensate for an obstacle, past or present, to that minor-
ity member's entry into, and equal treatment within, a certain type of job.
47 Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1102-03.
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
81 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982).
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sures, such as pressure from students, but these pressures may also
have been linked to Zerner's sex. Given the facts of life today, one
cannot simply conclude that the premium to Zerner was solely the
result of labor-market forces, nor that it was independent of sex.
At any rate, the Winkes court, by finding that the premium
would not have been offered to a man, expressly found that the
premium was not a labor-market premium for skill or merit or any
other factor independent of sex. Indeed, this conclusion seems al-
most unavoidable, given the testimony of the chairman of the art
department that Winkes and Zerner were of equal value apart
from sex. The holding in Winkes does not go beyond the idea of
equal pay for equal work regardless of sex.
Freed and Polsby concede that the Winkes decision can be ex-
plained by the finding that the premium would not have been of-
fered to a man. Yet they also criticize the court for rejecting, as a
matter of law, the university's defense that the differential was ex-
plainable as the result of a merit system, and they especially note
the court's skepticism about "non-objective" and "unsystematic"
merit explanations.52 The court did hold that, because the univer-
sity had no systematic method of evaluating merit, the merit-sys-
tem defense could not prevail. There are, however, two glaring in-
accuracies in Freed and Polsby's presentation of the Winkes
decision on this point.
In the portion of the opinion to which Freed and Polsby refer,
the court was only considering whether Brown had established a
"merit system" defense, one of three specific affirmative defenses
under the Equal Pay Act." Obviously, a merit "system" requires a
system, and a system requires identified criteria applied in an
identified manner. A supervisor's testimony at trial concerning the
relative merit of employees is not a merit system, though a merit
system can include subjective evaluations if based on identified cri-
teria applied in a systematic manner.M The Winkes court only
82 Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1102-04.
43 The Equal Pay Act requires equal pay for equal work, regardless of sex, "on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to
(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity
or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex." 29
U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
"In explaining the standard for a valid merit system under the Equal Pay Act, the
Winkes court noted that such a system is "an organized and structured procedure whereby
employees are evaluated systematically according to pre-determined criteria .... Further,
an unwritten merit system must meet two additional requirements: the employees must be
aware of it; and it must not be based upon sex." 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1046 (citations
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held that a merit system must be a system. Further, the court did
not hold that a merit differential is legal only if based on a merit
system. A merit differential might be due to a "factor other than
sex"-another Equal Pay Act affirmative defense55 -even though
an employer has no merit system. Indeed, the court in Winkes
went on to consider two other merit-related arguments, neither of
which was rejected on the ground that the university did not have
an objective merit system.
First, the university argued that the differential was the result
of a merit rating in the academic market, that is, that Northwest-
ern's offer was evidence of Zerner's value. This defense was not
rejected as insufficient as a matter of law. The court merely held
that the university could not prevail on this defense simply by in-
troducing evidence of one outside offer. The university had to in-
troduce evidence showing that "the salaries at issue are genuinely
tied to the demands of the academic market-place. '56 Since the
Equal Pay Act was enacted to eliminate market discrimination
based on sex, an employer should not be able to justify paying a
man and woman differentially simply on the ground that a single
competing employer would pay one more than the other. Under
Winkes, the employer can introduce evidence indicating that a
market offer does justify a subsequent pay differential where the
offer is based on market valuation independent of sex, such as a
omitted).
The Winkes court did state that "'[t]he subjective evaluations of the employer cannot
stand alone as a basis for salary discrimination based on sex."' Id. (quoting Brennan v.
Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1974)). This does not mean that the
Winkes court would have objected to any merit system the application of which required
subjective judgments. Equal Pay Act cases often use the word "objective" to include appli-
cation of identified criteria in a prescribed manner, though subjective judgments may be
involved.
Indeed, the Winkes court repeatedly indicated that Brown would have had a valid
merit system had it implemented a procedure, formal or informal, under which identified
criteria were systematically applied to faculty. 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1046-47. Obvi-
ously, no truly objective proxies are available to measure academic merit, and subjective
judgments would have been made under such a system. In quoting from Victoria Bank, the
Winkes court indicated that trial testimony of subjective impressions, unsubstantiated by
evidence of differences between employees and not arrived at systematically, cannot alone
justify a wage differential between men and women. This is the holding of Victoria Bank.
See supra note 32. In Victoria Bank, the court upheld salary differentials based on applica-
tion of a formal merit system under which the managers of departments graded employees
"on their knowledge of the job, their ability in their present job, their ability to meet the
public, and other general characteristics." 493 F.2d at 901. Subjective judgments would, of
course, be necessary in applying such a system.
" See supra note 53.
" Winkes, 32 Fair Empl Prac. Cas. at 1047.
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shortage of art historians with a particular specialization or the
fact that one art historian has greater expertise or skill than an-
other. In Winkes, the university simply failed to present such evi-
dence; indeed, the chairman of the art department testified that
only Zerner's sex made her more valuable than Winkes.57
Second, the university argued that the pay differential was the
result of the university's sex-neutral policy of responding to
outside offers. Again, this argument was not rejected as a matter of
law. Instead, the court found the argument implausible given the
facts of the case. The court pointed particularly to the consent de-
cree, the fact that Zerner was the only tenured woman in the art
department, the department chairman's statement that Zerner and
Winkes had equal value apart from sex, and the exceptional dollar-
for-dollar response to Northwestern's offer.
Freed and Polsby conclude that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for an employer ever to justify paying a man more than
a woman in an attempt to retain his services in the face of a higher
outside offer.58 It is true that the mere fact that the man had re-
ceived a higher outside offer would not justify a subsequent pay
differential. The Equal Pay Act, after all, was enacted to eliminate
market differentials that, it was thought, might be sex-based. If the
employer introduced credible evidence that the market differential
was not sex-based, however, Winkes would not support a rejection
of the defense.59
57 Id. at 1048.
" Freed & Posby, supra note 2, at 1104. Indeed, they state that if it were a man who
were paid more, the case for an Equal Pay Act violation would be even stronger. Id. n.69.
This ignores the fact that the Brown consent decree was part of the smoldering background
in the case; the decree would not have been relevant if a man were paid more in response to
an outside offer.
5' The First Circuit recently reversed the district court's decision in Winkes. Winkes v.
Brown Univ., No. 83-1649 (1st Cir. Oct. 26, 1984). In its opinion, the court noted that a
university has a legitimate "concern with respect to gender, as well as any ethnic or other
class underrepresentation." Id., slip op. at 11. The court considered even more "room to
maneuver" appropriate in dealing with "the difficult subject of gender" when a university is
subject to an affirmative-action consent decree. Id. at 15. Thus, the court came close to
holding that "reasonable decisions" to discriminate in favor of women by universities are
permissible, especially if the university is subject to a consent decree. See id. Such discrimi-
nation would apparently be permissible in the form of pay premiums for women, even
though Brown's consent decree did not have any provisions "authorizing" such action, be-
cause Brown was committed to increasing the number of women on its faculty.
Without committing itself to this analysis, the First Circuit reversed on the facts, hold-
ing that, on the basis of all the evidence in the record, the district court's conclusion-that
the university had offered the premium because of Zerner's sex-was clearly erroneous. To
the extent that the reversal was on the facts, my analysis is unaffected; whether or not
Brown violated the Equal Pay Act turns on whether Zerner would have been offered the
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Perhaps Freed and Polsby's real objection is to the idea of
equal pay itself. The Equal Pay Act will operate to decrease em-
ployee mobility when a premium cannot credibly be explained
apart from sex, and it may encourage women who are in high de-
mand because of their sex to take their premium in other forms,
such as leisure. An employer could not, however, give a woman
who is in high demand (solely because of her sex) a premium in
any form, including leisure, without violating Title VII.60 Admit-
tedly, if employers cannot offer her any premium, she may not end
up working for the employer who values her most, but this "prob-
lem" is the inevitable result of equality. To the extent that a stat-
ute mandating equal treatment of men and women is effective, it
will preclude the market from efficiently allocating labor on the
basis of sex.
I do not see any distinction between Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act in this respect; if Freed and Polsby disagree with the an-
tidiscrimination policy in one law, they must also disagree with it
in the other. Perhaps Freed and Polsby would agree that it is fine
to outlaw discrimination on the basis of sex or race but argue that
when we outlaw discrimination in pay, comparable-worth issues in-
evitably arise, and that is bad. The implication of Freed and
Polsby's analysis is that the Equal Pay Act should therefore be
repealed and that Title VII should be limited to non-wage discrim-
ination in employment.
Comparable-worth issues are not unique to Equal Pay Act
cases. In any action alleging intentional discrimination on an im-
permissible basis, there may be comparable-worth issues."1 For ex-
premium had she been a man. Further, to the extent that the court held that a university
can discriminate in pay to retain women, at least when there is a consent decree in the
background, I stand by my analysis. I think that the First Circuit, like Freed and Polsby,
would abandon the policy of equal pay for equal work, but for different reasons. The First
Circuit would abandon this policy, when unequal pay favors women, to rescue employers
from being forced to choose between "the devil and the deep blue sea." Id. Freed and Pol-
shy would abandon the policy because they think that employers should be able to value
employees differentially on the basis of sex, regardless of whether the differential favors or
disfavors women.
When an employer pays women, but not men, premiums to retain their services, it vio-
lates both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. The fact that, in settling another lawsuit, it
agreed to try to increase the number of women on its faculty should be irrelevant unless a
pay differential is a legitimate form of affirmative action. I question whether it should be.
See supra note 46.
" Title VII provides that an employer cannot discriminate in "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of ... sex." Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit.
VII, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
41 My remarks are limited to cases other than those in which there has been express
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ample, in a challenge to a promotion or hiring decision, a court will
consider whether the differences in the training and experience of
M and F explain why M was promoted over F. Indeed, depending
on how an employer attempts to explain a challenged employment
decision, any suit alleging impermissible discrimination may end
up turning on the issues Freed and Polsby have identified as com-
parable-worth issues: the relative value of various forms of training
and job experience, the relevance of such factors to the challenged
decision, the need for flexibility in job assignments, and the rele-
vance and probative value of evaluations of applicants' past per-
formance and of their future potential, including productivity mea-
sures and estimates of applicants' personal qualities.
Moreover, if Freed and Polsby object to the Equal Pay Act's
disruption of market allocations on the basis of sex, they must also
object to the disruptions caused by Title VII. Title VII rejects the
market's use of race, sex, religion, national origin, and color in em-
ployment decisions, despite the fact that-indeed because-the
market would take these characteristics into account. If the Equal
Pay Act's interference with the market is bad, why should we in-
terfere when the market responds on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, or national origin? Freed and Polsby's discussion of Winkes
suggests more than a claim that there are comparable-worth
problems in Equal Pay Act cases. It suggests that the authors may
disagree with the policy decision represented by the Equal Pay Act
and, apparently, by Title VII.
B. Melani
Freed and Polsby next discuss problems of proof in antidis-
crimination cases. They focus on Melani v. Board of Higher Edu-
cation,62 in which plaintiffs alleged discrimination in women's
wages at the City University of New York under Title VII and sec-
tion 1983.83 In Melani, the district court allowed plaintiffs to es-
tablish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing disparities
between the salaries of men and women through the use of multi-
discrimination on an impermissible basis. Today, of course, express-discrimination cases are
rather rare except where there is uncertainty as to whether Title VII covers a particular
form of discrimination. See, e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983)
(Title ViI bars employers from offering employees a choice of pension benefits, all of which
pay lower benefits to women than to men); City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (Title VII prohibits requiring female employees to contribute
more to pension fund than males).
:2 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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ple regression analysis of questionable validity."'
Freed and Polsby have identified a major problem area in an-
tidiscrimination litigation: the use of multiple regression data to
prove intentional discrimination by showing disparities in pay or
other disparities, such as disparities in job placement.65 As some
courts and commentators have noted, lawyers and judges often ac-
cept these numbers as reflections of reality without any apprecia-
tion of the problems, especially the many subjective judgments,
present in such an analysis.6
Freed and Polsby discuss two specific problems with proving
discrimination through multiple regression data.6 7  The first is
whether subjective measures of productivity should be admissible
to explain disparities. In Melani, the court held that the plaintiffs
had established a prima facie case without including subjective
productivity measures in their regression model.6 8 Freed and
Polsby conclude that because the defendant might have been able
, Melani, 561 F. Supp. at 773-81.
16 A multiple regression analysis using wages as the dependent variable and sex as one
of the independent variables could be used to test the validity of the proposition that the
employer does not discriminate on the basis of sex in setting wages. Such an analysis would
be an accurate test of this proposition only if all valid reasons for pay differentials were
accurately identified and quantified as independent variables. The use of multiple regression
analysis to establish discrimination should not be confused with the use of simpler statistics
to establish a case of disparate impact under Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Under Griggs, a plaintiff can challenge the use of some test or other objective criterion that
has an adverse disparate impact on a minority group. The adverse disparate impact can be
shown by introducing simple so-called binomial statistics showing the disparity (for exam-
ple, that 96% of whites pass the test but only 60% of the minority group pass). Once this
disparity is established, the employer must show that the test is a meaningful measure of
skills needed for the job in question.
In disparate-impact cases, statistics can be evaluated with relative ease. If 96% of
whites pass the test, compared with only 60% of the minority group, even a nonexpert can
be fairly confident that there is a difference in the performance of the two groups.
" See, for example, the concern expressed by Judge Higginbotham in Vuyanich v. Re-
public Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224, 394 (N.D. Tex. 1980), modified in part, 521 F. Supp.
656 (N.D. Tex. 1981), vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984):
This opinion has been written and rewritten, or equally accurate, has been calculated
and recalculated, over the past year .... [I]t has to judicial eyes a surrealistic cast,
mirroring the techniques used in its trial. Excursions into the new and sometimes ar-
cane corners of different disciplines [are] familiar [to] American trial lawyers and...
generalist judges. But more is afoot here, and this court is uncomfortable with its im-
plications. This concern has grown with the realization that the esoterics of
econometrics and statistics which both parties have required this court to judge have a
centripetal dynamic of their own.... [T]he precision-like mesh of numbers tends to
make fits of social problems when I intuitively doubt such fits. I remain wary of the
siren call of the numerical display and hope that here the resistance was adequate; that
the ultimate findings are the product of judgment, not calculation.
6" Freed & Posby, supra note 2, at 1106-10.
" Melani v. Board of Higher Educ., 561 F. Supp. 769, 778-79, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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to introduce evidence showing that differences in treatment could
be explained by differences in productivity, the decision in Melani
may not be unreasonable6 9 In Melani, however, the court indi-
cated that it would not allow the use of a productivity variable
where productivity might be significantly affected by the em-
ployer's own discriminatory actions.70 A subjective measure of pro-
ductivity offered by the employer would be expected to reflect any
discriminatory animus on the employer's part.
The court's position may at first seem reasonable. After all, in
Melani the defendant's own expert conceded that "a regression
analysis seeking to determine the existence of sex-based discrimi-
nation should not include as independent variables productivity
factors which may be affected significantly by the employer's ac-
tions. 7' From a statistician's perspective, such a principle is valid;
subjective measures of productivity can mask discrimination, with
the result that the multiple regression analysis could fail to reveal
discrimination that in fact was present.
Nevertheless, there is a problem with adopting this principle
as a rule of law in discrimination cases. In the absence of adequate
objective measures of productivity, such a rule will result in find-
ings of discrimination whenever there are differences between the
performances of men and women. Meaningful objective productiv-
ity measures are difficult to find for many sorts of jobs. In most
instances-and certainly for faculty at a university-there are no
strong objective proxies for productivity. If men and women do dif-
fer in productivity in the absence of discrimination, 2 a rule of law
that subjective proxies are inadmissible may be equivalent to a
rule that plaintiffs prevail.
Since even innocent employers may well be found to have dis-
criminated if only objective proxies for productivity are used in
69 Freed & Polsby, supra note 2, at 1107.
0 561 F. Supp. at 778.
71 Id.
7 Evidence from the social sciences indicates that discrete groups-not only men and
women but also, for example, redheads and blondes--are likely to vary from each other in
more than one characteristic. Some variation in performance or productivity between men
and women is therefore not unlikely (even absent discrimination). One would expect men to
do better at some tasks than women, and vice versa. See Meier, Sacks & Zabell, What Hap-
pened in Hazelwood: Statistics, Employment Discrimination, and the 80% Rule, 1984 AM.
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 139, 158-59 (discussing the significance of correlated characteristics).
The point here is that, even absent discrimination, men and women cannot be expected to
be equally productive in every job. If employers are not permitted to introduce any evidence
on productivity, they are likely to be found to have discriminated when they have not in
fact done so.
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multiple regression analysis, courts should allow reasonable subjec-
tive measures. In cases challenging individual employment deci-
sions without evidence in the form of multiple regression analysis,
courts routinely allow such evidence (for example, supervisors' ap-
praisals) to rebut the inference of discrimination raised by the
plaintiff's prima facie case.73 Arguments for admitting subjective
evaluations are at least as compelling when the inference of dis-
crimination is created by multiple regression evidence, 4 which it-
self reflects many subjective judgments by experts. These "expert"
judgments are difficult for courts to perceive, much less to
evaluate.
The second problem identified by Freed and Polsby is the Me-
lani court's willingness to find a prima facie case on the basis of
disparities between the salary performance and job placement of
men and women on a university-wide basis. Freed and Polsby's
discussion of this issue is, I believe, right on target. There are two
reasons why the court should not have found that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of discrimination. First, as Freed
and Polsby point out, the evidence was simply too weak to provide
a basis for an inference of discrimination." Second, as Freed and
Polsby also point out, Melani is hard to distinguish from a compa-
rable-worth case.
I would like to add a little to Freed and Polsby's argument on
this last point. Courts allowing Melani-type actions-and Melani
is not unique-seem not to realize that such decisions are inconsis-
tent with congressional rejection of a comparable-worth standard
and with cases rejecting challenges based directly on comparable-
worth arguments. The legislative history of the Equal Pay Act
reveals that Congress considered and rejected a comparable-worth
standard.7 6 Further, the legislative history of Title VII suggests
73 See, e.g., Hodgson v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 63 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 32,378 (S.D.
Tex. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1971).
74 Perhaps not all subjective measures should be entitled to the same weight. But that
notion goes to the persuasiveness of the evidence, not its admissibility.
75 For a case refusing to recognize a prima facie case on the basis of such evidence, see
Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 459 U.S.
809 (1982).
7' The Kennedy Administration endorsed a comparable-worth standard. See Equal Pay
for Equal Work: Hearings on H.R. 8898, H.R. 10226 Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 26-27 (1962) (testi-
mony of Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg and Assistant Secretary of Labor Esther Pe-
terson). Such a bill was reported out of the House Committee. See 108 CONG. RC. 14,767
(1962) (remarks of Rep. St. George concerning the undesirability of the "comparable worth"
language in the bill). When the legislation was finally enacted the following year, it con-
tained an equal-work standard; the debates reveal a clear rejection of the comparable-worth
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that Congress did not change its mind a year later.7 To date,
courts have dismissed direct comparable-worth challenges, that is,
cases in which the plaintiff's challenge is based on gross disparities
between sex-segregated jobs that have comparable worth according
to the plaintiff's standard.7 8
Thus, if the jobs in Melani had been segregated by sex, the
Melani court would presumably have followed other courts in re-
fusing to allow women in the lower-paying (and different) jobs to
challenge pay disparities by attempting to show that sex was the
only variable that could explain the disparity. Yet, simply because
the jobs, though quite different, were not segregated, the Melani
court allowed the plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case by intro-
ducing evidence of disparities in pay not limited to substantially
equal or substantially identical jobs.
Of course, Congress did enact Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act, and, as discussed above, actions under these statutes inevita-
bly raise comparable-worth issues.79 Yet Congress decided not to
enact legislation allowing claims based solely on notions of compa-
rable worth. The question therefore becomes: on which side of the
legislative compromise does a case based on university-wide evi-
dence of disparities in pay, such as Melani, fall?
I agree with Freed and Polsby: to allow such challenges on the
basis of differences in pay between admittedly different jobs opens
too wide a back door to comparable-worth actions. Such holdings
are inconsistent with congressional intent and with the many
Equal Pay Act cases allowing challenges to disparities in pay only
for substantially identical or substantially equal jobs. For this rea-
son, and because of the need for a prima facie case of some proba-
tive value, courts should refuse to recognize prima facie cases of
discrimination on the basis of general disparities between the pay
of men and of women unless the disparities exist between jobs that
are substantially identical or substantially equal.
Freed and Polsby's discussion of three real-life cases, City of
Milwaukee, Winkes, and Melani, is perhaps the most intriguing
part of their paper. They criticize examples of comparable-worth
reasoning in current case law, and they make insightful comments
standard. See, e.g., 109 CONG. REC. 9197-98 (1963) (cosponsor explaining that change in
language from "comparable" to "equal" narrowed the scope of the bill).
7 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964) (floor manager of bill: "The standards in the
Equal Pay Act for determining discrimination as to wages, of course, are applicable to the
comparable situation under Title VII.").
78 See B. ScHim & P. GROssMAN, supra note 11, at 477-78.
79 See supra text accompanying note 61.
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on issues arising when proof includes multiple regression analysis.
As in their earlier sections, however, Freed and Polsby have over-
stated the extent of the problems in Equal Pay Act cases (though
in their discussion of Melani, there is at least some awareness of
the fact that these problems can arise under Title VII as well). The
Winkes discussion is especially intriguing, since it suggests that
Freed and Polsby may actually disagree with the underlying policy
of antidiscrimination legislation. If they do, that might explain
their otherwise puzzling hostility to the treatment of job segrega-
tion as relevant to Equal Pay Act disputes.
CONCLUSION
Freed and Polsby make important contributions. Courts
should be sensitive to comparable-worth issues in current cases
and should refuse to enter judgments for plaintiffs solely on the
basis of comparable-worth arguments. In assessing the strength of
a case based on multiple regression analysis, courts should be espe-
cially careful to ensure that evidence of disparities involves sub-
stantially equal or substantially identical jobs.
Nevertheless, I am puzzled by this paper. I do not understand
why Freed and Polsby spend so much time criticizing cases that do
not state generally accepted law. Nor do I understand why, if their
real objection is to the idea of equal pay for equal work or to an-
tidiscrimination legislation as such, they make so indirect an
attack.
Freed and Polsby suggest, at least by implication, that the
Equal Pay Act should be more controversial given the problems
created by the comparable-worth issues raised by Equal Pay Act
cases and by the controversy surrounding comparable worth. I do
not agree. Comparable-worth issues will inevitably arise in the im-
plementation of any antidiscrimination legislation; the cost of
eliminating such issues is the repeal of all such legislation. In any
event, the "problems" are not so severe: courts have not been as
incompetent in dealing with comparable-worth issues, under either
Title VII or the Equal Pay Act, as Freed and Polsby suggest.
Moreover, the range of comparable-worth issues that can be
brought under current antidiscrimination legislation is narrow
compared with those that would arise under a broad comparable-
worth standard. There may be questions about whether orderlies'
jobs and aides' jobs are comparable or about whether minor non-
sex-based differences between jobs or employees can credibly ex-
plain a pay differential. But these questions are far easier than
whether a pay differential between janitors and secretaries, or be-
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tween truck drivers and nurses, is reasonable.
To say that a court's job would be more difficult under a com-
parable-worth standard, however, is not to say that Freed and
Polsby have succeeded in making a compelling case for its rejec-
tion. They have not directly addressed the problems in implement-
ing such a standard, and their indirect attack cannot survive close
scrutiny.
